A question came up about whether it is fair to say "While the human-made artifact is no more complex than a plant or animal or even a rock, it is no less complex either" (in a piece on Goethean science and human artifacts). The human, machine-like order placed over raw materials is no where as complex as that of a natural substance.
My reply was:
I was trying to address that we lose sight of where the things around us come from -- not just non-human nature (not sure how else to say that) but also social processes. First, these artifacts do come from nature and by exploring that aspect of them we recover something, or maybe at least understand something of the human-nature relationship. Second, I am not trying to say that, say, one of those robo-dogs is as complex as a real dog as a dog. But I do think that history and social relations are expressed in the artifact, but that this dimension is generally obscured or lost. That dimension is very complex because it ties into a very large web (if not ultimately all) of human interactions, history, desires, etc., and expresses nature processes of a different sort than that of a dog. (And Goethean science helps us reach and experience that, etc. etc.)
(Also, this human dimension also exists for non-human nature to the extent that human beings have transformed ecosystems, species, etc.)
jd
Wednesday, September 27, 2006
Saturday, September 23, 2006
Goethean science overview
The following is an excerpt from a longer piece I did, it gives an overview of Goethe's approach to science. The numbers in parentheses are page references to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: Scientific studies, translated and edited by Douglas Miller (1988). - jd
Although Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's approach to science is primarily a way of knowing (Wahl, 2005), it implies at the same time a particular understanding of how the world is organized. In Goethe's world view, nature is "alive and active, with its efforts directed from the whole to the parts" (20). Everything is interconnected and dynamic and in a process of formation (bildung). Goethe's world view is monistic. Concepts, ideas, even the "archetype" (urphänomen) are not separate from phenomena, standing behind it, but part of the phenomena.
This living, dynamic, interconnected world is known first through the senses. The Goethean approach is strongly empirical, emphasizing the importance of direct observation and experience in knowing the world. The phenomena is central, but Goethe also recognized that perception is a participatory act, anticipating phenomenology by 100 years (Heinemann, 1934; Seamon, 1998). The observed works on the observer as much as the observer works on the observed. In a play on words ("an ingenious turn of phrase"), "objective thinking" for Goethe "means that my thinking is not separate from objects; that the elements of the object, the perceptions of the object, flow into my thinking and are fully permeated by it; that my perception itself is a thinking, and my thinking a perception." (39) The observer-as-subject does not disappear when "thinking objectively" (if even that were possible).
Empirical data is always understood within a theoretical framework, and so it is important for the investigator to be conscious of the framework being used. Goethe went a step further though, bringing his artistic sensibility to bear on the investigation. The careful, detailed observation of phenomena is complemented by what he called "exact sensory imagination" (46). Phenomena are processes that are in a constant state of formation, and empiricism can only examine parts of a process, snapshots in time. Because a process exists and develops through its interconnections, it has an integrity that cannot be grasped through dissection or reduction (although they may contribute to understanding). This is especially the case with living organisms. In order to grasp the living whole of the phenomenon, the investigator must bring the phenomenon to life in the imagination.
Experiments play an important role in Goethean science, but Goethe cautions against the easy temptation of drawing false conclusions. Experiments are properly used to recreate previous experience, or to coax new experiences out of phenomenon under specific conditions. Using experiments to prove a hypothesis is "detrimental" (15), because of the tendency to ignore experiences that fall outside of the hypothesis: "Thus we can never be too careful in our efforts to avoid drawing hasty conclusions from experiments or using them directly as proof to bear out some theory. For here at this pass, this transition from empirical evidence to judgment, cognition to application, all the inner enemies of man lie in wait." (14) For the investigator, phenomena are part of many causes and effects; the appropriate question is not one of causes or purpose ("what are they for?"), but of determining the conditions under which phenomena arise ("where do they come from?"). (121)
Goethe described different stages or modes of knowing, using different terms in various writings. In one place he describes a sequence flowing from "empirical phenomena", observations found in nature, to "scientific phenomena", where the phenomena is understood well enough to reproduce under controlled conditions, via experiments, to "pure phenomena", which is a purely mental process, where the heart of the phenomena is comprehended, and "the human mind gives a definition to the empirically variable, excludes the accidental, sets aside the impure, untangles the complicated, and even discovers the unknown." (25) Elsewhere he describes an empirical phase of careful study yielding to the necessity of visualizing internally the various observations in order to gain a sense of the whole. Empirical observation gives way to an intuitive perception:
Elsewhere, Goethe describes his general process as proceeding from empirical observation to archetype (118), and elsewhere, "of what nature bears within itself as law" (147).
Goethe's concept of "archetype" is one of his more difficult concepts. In his "Maxims", Goethe describes the archetype in four ways: as "ideal" in the sense of the "ultimate we can know"; "real" because we experience its expression; "symbolic" because it represents all instances; "identical" because it is identical with all instances. The archetype is expressed concretely through phenomena. The archetype describes an inner lawfulness or logic or coherence, a "structural range" (120) within which the archetype can be expressed. Naydler (1996) describes it like this: "The Archetypal Phenomenon is experienced when a group or sequence of phenomena real an underlying meaningfulness and internal coherence which is grasped by the intellect in a moment of intuitive comprehension." (p. 103)
Goethe sought to identify archetypes for minerals (Amrine, 1998; Steiner, 2000), plants and animals. Through the emphasis of one aspect over another, the archetype manifests in various forms. Goethe described his archetypal plant in a 1787 letter: "The primordial plant is turning out to be the most marvelous creation in the world... With this model and the key to it an infinite number of additional plants can be invented, which must be logical, that is, if they do not exist, they could exist, and are not mere artistic or poetic shadows or semblances, but have an inner truth and necessity. The same law is applicable to every other living thing." (328-9)
The archetype should not be considered as a Platonic ideal form standing behind phenomena (Heinemann, 1934). Nor is it a blueprint or formula, or an abstract or symbolic rendition separate from the phenomena. Nor is it a statistical average or composite. The archetype is not separate from the phenomena. When challenged by Schiller that his archetype "was not an observation from experience" but "an idea," Goethe retorted, "Then I may rejoice that I have ideas without knowing it, and can even see them with my own eyes." (20)
The unification of object, perception and thought achieved through "exact sensory imagination" is a direct way of knowing. "Let us not seek for something behind the phenomena -- they themselves are the theory" (307), where theory is understood in its traditional sense as a "way of seeing" (Amrine, 1998). "There is a delicate empiricism that makes itself identical with the object, thereby becoming true theory." (307) In fact, for Goethe the observer has little say in the matter:
The "many different forms of existence" require different modes of thinking to fully know the object, including poetic and scientific modes (Root, 2006). In knowing the object, the object becomes "an organ of perception," a new way of sensing the world.
References
Amrine, F. (1998). The metamorphosis of the scientist. In Seamon, D. and Zajonc, A., eds. Goethe's Way of Science: Towards a phenomenology of nature.
Heinemann, F. (1934). Goethe's phenomenological method. Philosophy. (9) 67- 82.
Miller, D. ed. and trans. (1988). Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: Scientific studies. New York: Suhrkamp Publishers.
Naydler, J. (1996). Goethe on science. Edinburgh: Floris Books.
Root, C. (Spring, 2006). Conversation between friends: An inspiration for Goethe's phenomenological method. In context. 15. Ghent, NY: The Nature Institute.
Seamon, D. (1998). Goethe, nature and phenomenology: An introduction. In Seamon, D. and Zajonc, A., eds. Goethe's Way of Science: Towards a phenomenology of nature.
Steiner, R. (2000). Nature's open secret: Introductions to Goethe's scientific writings. Hudson, NY: Anthroposophic Press.
Wahl, D. (Summer, 2005). "Zaire Empirie": Goethean science as a way of knowing. Janus Head. 8(1).
Although Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's approach to science is primarily a way of knowing (Wahl, 2005), it implies at the same time a particular understanding of how the world is organized. In Goethe's world view, nature is "alive and active, with its efforts directed from the whole to the parts" (20). Everything is interconnected and dynamic and in a process of formation (bildung). Goethe's world view is monistic. Concepts, ideas, even the "archetype" (urphänomen) are not separate from phenomena, standing behind it, but part of the phenomena.
This living, dynamic, interconnected world is known first through the senses. The Goethean approach is strongly empirical, emphasizing the importance of direct observation and experience in knowing the world. The phenomena is central, but Goethe also recognized that perception is a participatory act, anticipating phenomenology by 100 years (Heinemann, 1934; Seamon, 1998). The observed works on the observer as much as the observer works on the observed. In a play on words ("an ingenious turn of phrase"), "objective thinking" for Goethe "means that my thinking is not separate from objects; that the elements of the object, the perceptions of the object, flow into my thinking and are fully permeated by it; that my perception itself is a thinking, and my thinking a perception." (39) The observer-as-subject does not disappear when "thinking objectively" (if even that were possible).
Empirical data is always understood within a theoretical framework, and so it is important for the investigator to be conscious of the framework being used. Goethe went a step further though, bringing his artistic sensibility to bear on the investigation. The careful, detailed observation of phenomena is complemented by what he called "exact sensory imagination" (46). Phenomena are processes that are in a constant state of formation, and empiricism can only examine parts of a process, snapshots in time. Because a process exists and develops through its interconnections, it has an integrity that cannot be grasped through dissection or reduction (although they may contribute to understanding). This is especially the case with living organisms. In order to grasp the living whole of the phenomenon, the investigator must bring the phenomenon to life in the imagination.
Experiments play an important role in Goethean science, but Goethe cautions against the easy temptation of drawing false conclusions. Experiments are properly used to recreate previous experience, or to coax new experiences out of phenomenon under specific conditions. Using experiments to prove a hypothesis is "detrimental" (15), because of the tendency to ignore experiences that fall outside of the hypothesis: "Thus we can never be too careful in our efforts to avoid drawing hasty conclusions from experiments or using them directly as proof to bear out some theory. For here at this pass, this transition from empirical evidence to judgment, cognition to application, all the inner enemies of man lie in wait." (14) For the investigator, phenomena are part of many causes and effects; the appropriate question is not one of causes or purpose ("what are they for?"), but of determining the conditions under which phenomena arise ("where do they come from?"). (121)
Goethe described different stages or modes of knowing, using different terms in various writings. In one place he describes a sequence flowing from "empirical phenomena", observations found in nature, to "scientific phenomena", where the phenomena is understood well enough to reproduce under controlled conditions, via experiments, to "pure phenomena", which is a purely mental process, where the heart of the phenomena is comprehended, and "the human mind gives a definition to the empirically variable, excludes the accidental, sets aside the impure, untangles the complicated, and even discovers the unknown." (25) Elsewhere he describes an empirical phase of careful study yielding to the necessity of visualizing internally the various observations in order to gain a sense of the whole. Empirical observation gives way to an intuitive perception:
If I look at the created object, inquire into its creation, and follow this process back as far as I can, I will find a series of steps. Since these are not actually seen together before me, I must visualize them in my memory so that they form a certain ideal whole.
At first I will tend to think in terms of steps, but nature leaves no gaps, and thus, in the end, I will have to see this progression of uninterrupted activity as a whole. I can do so by dissolving the particular without destroying the impression itself.
If we imagine the outcome of these attempts, we will see that empirical observation finally ceases, intuitive perception of the developing organism begins, and the idea is brought to expression in the end. (75)
Elsewhere, Goethe describes his general process as proceeding from empirical observation to archetype (118), and elsewhere, "of what nature bears within itself as law" (147).
Goethe's concept of "archetype" is one of his more difficult concepts. In his "Maxims", Goethe describes the archetype in four ways: as "ideal" in the sense of the "ultimate we can know"; "real" because we experience its expression; "symbolic" because it represents all instances; "identical" because it is identical with all instances. The archetype is expressed concretely through phenomena. The archetype describes an inner lawfulness or logic or coherence, a "structural range" (120) within which the archetype can be expressed. Naydler (1996) describes it like this: "The Archetypal Phenomenon is experienced when a group or sequence of phenomena real an underlying meaningfulness and internal coherence which is grasped by the intellect in a moment of intuitive comprehension." (p. 103)
Goethe sought to identify archetypes for minerals (Amrine, 1998; Steiner, 2000), plants and animals. Through the emphasis of one aspect over another, the archetype manifests in various forms. Goethe described his archetypal plant in a 1787 letter: "The primordial plant is turning out to be the most marvelous creation in the world... With this model and the key to it an infinite number of additional plants can be invented, which must be logical, that is, if they do not exist, they could exist, and are not mere artistic or poetic shadows or semblances, but have an inner truth and necessity. The same law is applicable to every other living thing." (328-9)
The archetype should not be considered as a Platonic ideal form standing behind phenomena (Heinemann, 1934). Nor is it a blueprint or formula, or an abstract or symbolic rendition separate from the phenomena. Nor is it a statistical average or composite. The archetype is not separate from the phenomena. When challenged by Schiller that his archetype "was not an observation from experience" but "an idea," Goethe retorted, "Then I may rejoice that I have ideas without knowing it, and can even see them with my own eyes." (20)
The unification of object, perception and thought achieved through "exact sensory imagination" is a direct way of knowing. "Let us not seek for something behind the phenomena -- they themselves are the theory" (307), where theory is understood in its traditional sense as a "way of seeing" (Amrine, 1998). "There is a delicate empiricism that makes itself identical with the object, thereby becoming true theory." (307) In fact, for Goethe the observer has little say in the matter:
When in the exercise of his powers of observation man undertakes to confront the world of nature, he will at first experience a tremendous compulsion to bring what he finds there under his control. Before long, however, these objects will thrust themselves upon him with such force that he, in turn, must feel the obligation to acknowledge their power and pay homage to their effects. When this mutual interaction becomes evident he will make a discovery which, in a double sense, is limitless; among the objects he will find many different forms of existence and modes of change, a variety of relationships livingly interwoven; in himself, on the other hand, a potential for infinite growth through constant adaptation of his sensibilities and judgment to new ways of acquiring knowledge and responding with action. This discovery produces a deep sense of pleasure and would bring the last touch of happiness in life if not for certain obstacles (within and without) which impede our progress along this beautiful path to perfection. (61)
The "many different forms of existence" require different modes of thinking to fully know the object, including poetic and scientific modes (Root, 2006). In knowing the object, the object becomes "an organ of perception," a new way of sensing the world.
References
Amrine, F. (1998). The metamorphosis of the scientist. In Seamon, D. and Zajonc, A., eds. Goethe's Way of Science: Towards a phenomenology of nature.
Heinemann, F. (1934). Goethe's phenomenological method. Philosophy. (9) 67- 82.
Miller, D. ed. and trans. (1988). Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: Scientific studies. New York: Suhrkamp Publishers.
Naydler, J. (1996). Goethe on science. Edinburgh: Floris Books.
Root, C. (Spring, 2006). Conversation between friends: An inspiration for Goethe's phenomenological method. In context. 15. Ghent, NY: The Nature Institute.
Seamon, D. (1998). Goethe, nature and phenomenology: An introduction. In Seamon, D. and Zajonc, A., eds. Goethe's Way of Science: Towards a phenomenology of nature.
Steiner, R. (2000). Nature's open secret: Introductions to Goethe's scientific writings. Hudson, NY: Anthroposophic Press.
Wahl, D. (Summer, 2005). "Zaire Empirie": Goethean science as a way of knowing. Janus Head. 8(1).
Thursday, September 21, 2006
Goethean science and human artifacts
I wrote up an essay sort of thing on Goethean scienec and how it might be used in the investigation of human artifacts. Here's the link: Talking with history: Using Goethe's scientific approach with human artifacts
jd
jd
Tuesday, September 5, 2006
Salsa recipe
What is cooking if not interconnection? This recipe came from Liz. (Thanks Liz).
Liz's Salsa
6 jalapeno peppers
1 12-oz can Hunt's whole tomatoes
1/2 large sweet onion, chopped
1/2 bunch of cilantro, chopped
Juice of one lime
Garlic powder (maybe a tablespoon?), or few cloves fresh garlic
8 shakes of salt
some black pepper
Boil the jalapeno peppers in water until army green (or less), remove stems.
In a blender, combine everything and blend away.
Heat will vary w/ jalapenos, you can also adjust by number of peppers; lime juice cuts the heat. Salsa will mellow overnight (refrigerate of course).
The hot part of the peppers is the white stuff that holds the seeds, so you could do a nice salsa fresca by removing that part of the fresh jalapenos, and use fresh tomatoes instead of canned in above recipe. I've never tried it, but...
Liz's Salsa
6 jalapeno peppers
1 12-oz can Hunt's whole tomatoes
1/2 large sweet onion, chopped
1/2 bunch of cilantro, chopped
Juice of one lime
Garlic powder (maybe a tablespoon?), or few cloves fresh garlic
8 shakes of salt
some black pepper
Boil the jalapeno peppers in water until army green (or less), remove stems.
In a blender, combine everything and blend away.
Heat will vary w/ jalapenos, you can also adjust by number of peppers; lime juice cuts the heat. Salsa will mellow overnight (refrigerate of course).
The hot part of the peppers is the white stuff that holds the seeds, so you could do a nice salsa fresca by removing that part of the fresh jalapenos, and use fresh tomatoes instead of canned in above recipe. I've never tried it, but...
Thursday, August 31, 2006
Four laws of ecology
Barry Commoner's Four laws of ecology:
1. Everything is connected to everything else.
2. Everything must go somewhere.
3. Nature knows best.
4. There is no such thing as a free lunch.
From The Closing Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology, 1971.
1. Everything is connected to everything else.
2. Everything must go somewhere.
3. Nature knows best.
4. There is no such thing as a free lunch.
From The Closing Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology, 1971.
Thursday, August 24, 2006
Ecosystem of globalization - research proposal
I assembled a research proposal on the "ecosystem of globalization", using the concept of "ecological revolution" to test the idea of globalization as an "epochal shift." The research proposal was done as, well, as homework for a research methods seminar; the quantitative research was never done, but I did do a paper, or two papers out of the literature review ("Speculative capital and the ecosystem of globalization", a longer, more rambling piece, and a condensed version, "The ecosystem of globalization").
I tried to think about how one identifies an "ecological revolution", in order to know if the investigation would show that there is an "ecosystem of globalization" emerging. I proposed looking at the environmental impact of three (speculative) financial structures associated with globalization; and assessing them according to seven categories. Here's the section that laid out my criteria:
[See the proposal for the references]
jd
I tried to think about how one identifies an "ecological revolution", in order to know if the investigation would show that there is an "ecosystem of globalization" emerging. I proposed looking at the environmental impact of three (speculative) financial structures associated with globalization; and assessing them according to seven categories. Here's the section that laid out my criteria:
Categories for assessing ecosystem impact
Non-human categories (after Simmons, 1996)
(1) Biological productivity: A significant change moves the ecosystem from one type to another, where types are identified as forest; woodland, grassland or savannah; desert; cultivated land; urban; other terrestrial. The rationale is that each of these ecosystem types has a distinct net primary productivity (Simmons, 1996), and a shift from one ecosystem to another indicates a shift in biological productivity.
(2) Population dynamics and diversity: A significant change includes the removal of a keystone species, a key engineer species, or extinction, e.g. associated with unique habitat loss.
(3) Stability: A significant change is indicated by a potential change in (1) or (2).
Human-nature categories (after Merchant, 1989)
(4) Production process, including economic productivity: A significant change in the production process is indicated by a new form of motive power or central technology (e.g., the steam engine, the microchip (Davis, 2000))
(5) Social reproduction process: A significant change in the reproduction process is indicated by new productive relations.
(6) Property forms: A significant change in property forms is indicated in types of ownership or a changed the relationship of the owner to the thing owned. E.g., significant changes include a change from common ownership to private ownership, or single owner to corporate ownership, or tenant owner to absentee owner.
(7) Consciousness (representations of nature, narrative, ways of thinking about nature): A significant change in consciousness is indicated by a change in narrative (e.g., from progressive to declensionist, or declensionist to recovery), or change in valence (a role or character reversal, e.g., from nature as Eden to nature as vengeful), or a change in mode of participation (e.g., from subject-object to partnership) (Merchant, 1995).
For example, one identified impact of timber REITs is an increase in land ownership turnover (Block and Sample, 2001; Hagan, Irland and Whitman, 2005). After examining the impact of turnover, timber REITs might be categorized as:
-- signficant to stability (3) (e.g., rapid turnover has the potential of leading to clear-cutting or parcelization that leads to a change in ecosystem type or habitat loss), property forms (6);
-- insignificant to population dynamics and diversity (2) (i.e., some insignificant change is expected), (7) owners' and local inhabitants' way of thinking about the forest;
-- not applicable to biological productivity (1), economic productivity (4) and social reproduction (5).
In the case of land turnover, the applicable effects might be deemed to be relevant at the local and possibly regional level, but not at the global level.
[See the proposal for the references]
jd
Tuesday, August 22, 2006
Dialectical materialism
An addition to the Wikipedia entry on dialectical materialism:
New discoveries in physics (including x-rays, electrons, and the beginnings of quantum mechanics) challenged previous conceptions of matter and materialism. Matter seemed to be disappearing. Lenin disagreed:
Lenin was following on from the work of Engels, who had noted that "with each epoch-making discovery even in the sphere of natural science, materialism has to change its form." (Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy.) One of Lenin's challenges was distancing materialism as a viable philosophical outlook from what he referred to as the "vulgar materialism" expressed in statements like "the brain secretes thought in the same way as the liver secretes bile" (attributed to 18th century physician Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, 1757-1808); "metaphysical materialism" (matter is composed of immutable, unchanging particles); and 19th-century "mechanical materialism" (matter was like little molecular billiard balls interacting according to simple laws of mechanics). Lenin's (and Engels') solution to this challenge was "dialectical materialism", where matter was understood in the broader sense of "objective reality" and consistent with new developments in science.
New discoveries in physics (including x-rays, electrons, and the beginnings of quantum mechanics) challenged previous conceptions of matter and materialism. Matter seemed to be disappearing. Lenin disagreed:
'Matter disappears' means that the limit within which we have hitherto known matter disappears and that our knowledge is penetrating deeper; properties of matter are disappearing that formerly seemed absolute, immutable and primary, and which are now revealed to be relative and characteristic only of certain states of matter. For the sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of the mind.
Lenin was following on from the work of Engels, who had noted that "with each epoch-making discovery even in the sphere of natural science, materialism has to change its form." (Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy.) One of Lenin's challenges was distancing materialism as a viable philosophical outlook from what he referred to as the "vulgar materialism" expressed in statements like "the brain secretes thought in the same way as the liver secretes bile" (attributed to 18th century physician Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, 1757-1808); "metaphysical materialism" (matter is composed of immutable, unchanging particles); and 19th-century "mechanical materialism" (matter was like little molecular billiard balls interacting according to simple laws of mechanics). Lenin's (and Engels') solution to this challenge was "dialectical materialism", where matter was understood in the broader sense of "objective reality" and consistent with new developments in science.
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